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FOREWORD 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
is preparing a Handbook of Systems Analysis, which will appear 
in three volumes: 
Volume 1: Overview is aimed at a widely varied audience 
of producers and users of systems analysis studies. 
Volume 2: Methods is aimed at systems analysts and other 
members of systems analysis teams who need basic knowledge of 
methods in which they are not expert; this volume contains 
introductory overviews of such methods. 
Volume 3: Cases contains descriptions of actual systems 
analyses that illustrate the diversity of the contexts and 
methods of systems analysis. 
Drafts of the material for Volume 1 are being widely 
circulated for comment and suggested improvement. This Working 
Paper is the current draft of Chapter 6. Correspondence is 
invited . 
Volume 1 will consist of the following ten chapters: 
1. The context, nature, and use of systems analysis 
2. The genesis of applied systems analysis 
3. Examples of applied systems analysis 
4. The methods of applied systems analysis: An 
introduction and overview 
5. Formulating problems for systems analysis 
6. Objectives, constraints, and alternatives 
7. Predicting the consequences: Models and modeling 
. 8. Guidance for decision 
9. Implementation 
10. The practice of applied systems analysis 
To these ten chapters will be added a glossary of systems analysis 
terms and a bibliography of basic works in the field. 
12 October 1981 
Hugh J. Miser 
IIASA 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
Austria 
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CHAPTER 6. OBJECTTVES. CONSTRAINTS. AND ALTERNATTVES 
Edward. S. Quade 
To help a decisionrnaker means to help hlm acheve  h s  t rue  objectives; to 
do so, it is crucial to discover what they are.  To find feasible alternatives (l.e., 
ways Lo acheve the objectives that are not ruled out by the constraints imposed 
on the decisionmaker's actions by nature,  circumstance, authority, or the 
decisionmaker himself) is the central task of systems analysis. T h s  chapter,  
expanding the remarks in Chapter 4, discusses problems of clarification and 
measurement related to objectives, the roles of objectives and constraints in 
determining alternatives, and methods for discovering and improving alterna- 
tives, and eliminating the  inferior ones. 
1. OBJECTIVES 
Ideally, problems with objectives (and witn certain constraints, since they 
play a role sonlewhat similar to that  of objectives) should be settled very early 
in a systems analysis study. In practice, however, this is seldom possible. 
Unfortunately, a clear, well thought through, precisely spelled out,  and analyti- 
cally useful statement of what the decisionmaker wants to accomplish is rarely 
presented to the analyst a t  the tlme the study is commissioned. Kevertheless, 
some idea of what is wanted is available. Tentative objectives, specific enough to 
get the analysis s tarted,  can be selected; these should suggest possible ways to 
acheve the alternatives. The impacts, or consequences, of irriplementing these 
alternatives are then imagined or estimated, and their projected implications 
used to reexamine the  first formulation of objectives and introduce modifica- 
tions. As the study progresses, the analysts, their sponsors, and others learn 
from t h s  early work. The decisionmaker for whom the work is being carried out 
is also influenced by pressure from interested constituents and from other 
decisionmakers who may see their domain adversely affected by what they anti- 
cipate is likely to be done as a result of the study. Hence objectives and alterna- 
tives may change and constraints may be introduced or removed. This is one of 
the major reasons why systems analysis must be an  iterative process. 
To someone without systems analysis experience it may seem odd that  we 
s tar t  this discussion with the implied assumption that the objectives will not be 
spelled out sufficiently to allow the analysis team to adopt them as  given and 
proceed to their work. However, experience is almost universal on this point: 
decisionmakers seldom have carefully articulated objectives. T h s  apparently 
troublesome fact-whch leads to  the iterative search for realistic and accept- 
able objectives as part of the systems analysis-may lead the wishful analyst into 
dreaming of the "perfect client" who is the exception, so tha t  he can get quickly 
beyond the beginning statement of objectives to  what he may think of as the 
meat of the analysis. However, here again the voice of experience suggests tha t  
it may be better  not to have such clearly defined obejctives right a t  the begin- 
ning before a t  least some preliminary analysis has taken place, for the  objec- 
tives stated a t  the beginning will probably not be a s  well thought through a s  they 
should be ,  with the result that  the analyst will face the dilemma of tailoring his 
work to objectives he knows t o  be defective, or trying a t  the end to alter these 
fixtures in order to squeeze in some new perspectives. The experienced analyst 
does not rue the existence of hazy starting objectives; rather ,  he is thankful for  
them, as they offer h m  the opportunity to work with his client toward realistic 
and acceptable ones a s  the study proceeds. 
4 '  
The objectives of an individual or  of an organization a re  the  principles t ha t  
determine how they a re  to ac t .  As Sugden and Williams (1978) put  i t ,  "They a re  
not pious incantations of ethical or ideological beliefs which unfortunately can- 
not be acted on because of 'political constraints ' ;  they express  intentions to  
act ."  The analyst needs some thng  spec i f~c  enough t o  limit t he  se t  of alterna- 
tives and to  guide the choice among them.  In part icular ,  he would like this 
specificity t o  be such that  he can  tell the decisionmaker (as  soon as he can  get 
some clue as  to what they are)  what sor t s  of alternatives and  consequences a r e  
likely t o  result .  The decisionmaker can  then  conlirm t h a t  the s ta tement  of 
objectives expresses his intentions and offer another  suggestion if it does not .  
Even when objectives appear  t o  be well specified a t  the  outse t ,  they can  sel- 
dam be adopted uncritically by the analyst. Means a r e  sometimes t aken  for 
ends;  a decisionmaker may say tha t  h s  objective is t o  find out where to  place a 
new comprehensive medical cen ter  in his district, but  his real objective may be 
broader ,  say to improve the  totality of health servlces in hls community; be t t e r  
ways t o  achieve the real objective may  be t o  provide several neighbornhood 
health centers  or services through o ther  mechanisms (hospital  outpatient clin- 
ics or  health maintenance organizations). Perhaps programs focusing on mater -  
nal and c h l d  health services or screenin.g apparent ly well people to  t u rn  up 
hea r t  and cencer  conditions should be considered. Unless the  broader  objective 
is investigated by the  analyst, these la t te r  alternatives will not appear  and the  
decisionmaker may never realize ho-w m u c h  m o r e  he  cou.ld do with his 
resources.  
Desired goals can  be s ta ted  easily, but  specifying objectives one has a rea-  
sonable hope of attaining may take considerable thought ,  even research.  It m.ay 
not make  sense t o  make  up one 's  mind as t o  what one wants until one has a fair 
idea as to  what he can  get .  An important  way analysis helps in clarifying objec- 
tives is tha t  it determines the undesi.rable as  well a s  t he  desirable consuqences 
of the altc!rn.atives tha t  follow a n  assumpti011 about  objectives. The decision- 
maker ,  when confronted with these consequences,  c a n  ask himself whether he is 
willing to accept what they imply. I f  not, he will have to modify his goals. 
In the effort to clarify objectives and find ways to measure their attain- 
ment,  it is helpful to discuss the issue under analysis with several people who 
have no stake in the outcome-critical and skeptical outsiders. One seeks 
answers to questions such as "What is really a t  stake here?" Since attainment of 
the ultimate goal may be many years off, what practical intermediate goals 
should we strive for? 
For certain issues, the  question of whose objectives are  relevant has to  be 
considered. For public issues, it is some subset of the  citizens of today or  of 
future generations; the decisionmaker is merely the person or  organization 
charged with the responsibility for changing the system, and the  analyst may 
have to find some discrete way to make t h s  clear (Sugden and Williams 1978, 
pp. 232-242). 
High-level objectives tend to be ambiguous, for it is a political advantage to  
appeal to as many people as possible. In fact, it is often much easier in the pol- 
itical process to agree on an action or program than on a goal (unless the  lat ter  
is indefinite), for people may have different motives for what they are willing to  
do. High-level objectives tha t  express general good intentions are valid over a 
long time period and are the easiest for the decisionmaker to s ta te  (Hovey 
1968). A frequent problem is tha t  such objectives are difficult for the analyst t.o 
formulate with sufficient specificity for direct use in analytical studies. A lower- 
level objective tha t  is a means to achieve the hlgher-level objective may be 
required for analysis. To build a new health center is both a lower-level objective 
and a means to improve health services, a higher-level objective. Clear defini- 
tions of lower-level objectives a re  usually more easily provided and a re  techni- 
cally easier to use for finding and ranking alternatives. However, misleading 
results may occur if the lower-level objectives are not, under all cir.cumstances, 
an appropriate mehns to  achieve the higher-level objectives. The relation need 
not be direct; for example, to relocate fire stations to provide better fire ser- 
vice, the objective of lowering the average travel time from fire station to fire 
serves well as a substitute for bet ter  protection of lives and property (Chapter 3 
and Walker e t  al. :979). Travel time is, moreover, easily measurable and can 
thus serve as  an estimate of the extent to which the alternatives attain the 
objective. 
Capabilities designed with one objective in mind can differ considerably 
from those designed with another uppermost, even though both have the same 
higher-level goal. T h s  is a difficulty that can arise when one at tempts to  make a 
relatively vague higher-level objective operational by using a more specific 
lower-level formulation. Wohlstetter (1964) illustrates t h s  point for the case of 
automobile traffic safety: 
The city fathers would like to reduce the number of violations of 
the law. They would also like to fine or  put in the clink as many viola- 
tors  as they can. There are  two well known alternative techniques for 
accomplishing these ends; one is the familiar ambush technique; the 
other is sometimes called the visible patrol technique. The first 
increases the probability of interception and arrest .  The second 
discourages culpability. Now if our goal is to maximize the number or 
proportion of speeders punished, or the total of municipal revenue 
through fines, probably the best way to do the job is by ambush, how- 
ever uneasy such a sneaky tactic makes us. If our goal, on the  other 
hand, is a reduction in the  total number of traffic accidents, say, or in 
the  number of at tempts to  violate the law (even if on the whole such 
at tempts a t  evasion as do take place are more likely to be successful, 
since the culprit is aware of the cop's presence), it may very well be 
that the most frequent, obvious presence of policemen capable of 
instantaneous retaliation against speeders would encourage caution, 
and so achieve such goals best.  
I t  is interesting to review the cases discussed in Chapter 3 in t.he llght of 
these remarks about objectives: 
The basic objective of t h e  Greater New York Blood Program is t o  have 
blood available when and where needed-always. The only admissible exception 
is tha t  elective uses can  possibly, when necessary, be  postponed, although the  
costs of such  decisions a r e  recognized a s  making them undesirable. Deriving 
from this basic objective-whch was b e i ~  m e t  adequately when the  systems 
analysis was undertaken-are two subordinate objectives: t o  reduce the  amount  
of blood being outdated (and  hence discarded) to  the lowest level consistent with 
the  basic objective, and t o  reduce  the  costs of maintaining the  blood supply a t  
the  points of use a s  m u c h  as  possible consistent with t h e  basic objective. The 
simplicity and clarity of these objectives contributed a g r e a t  deal to t he  crisp 
clarity of the  analysis and  the  success of i ts implementation, because these 
objectives were widely accepted .  
The basic objective of the Wilmington Bureau of Fire is t h a t  of any fire 
depar tment :  t o  hold down as  m u c h  a s  possible the human  (dea th  and injury) 
and property losses from fire. However, owing to  the  lack of information in t he  
fi.re-fighting community about  t he  relations between t h s  objective and fire- 
fighting deployments and activities, t h s  Bureau-and the  systems analysts 
called in t o  help with i ts planning problem-accepted th ree  objectives tha t  were 
proxies for the basic objective: t o  keep travel t imes t o  individual locations down 
t o  a n  acceptably low level, t o  keep the average travel t ime in a region a t  a n  
acceptable level, and t o  maintain reasonable workloads for fire companies. As in 
t he  case of the  Greater New York Blood Program, before the  systems analysis 
began the Wilmington fire fighters were acheving their  basic objective t o  a level 
acceptable to  the community, so t h a t  one could argue pragmatically t ha t  t he  
existing level m e t  the  basic objective, and the words "acceptable" and "reason- 
able" in the s ta ten-ent  of the proxy objectives imply t h a t  fire-fighting officials 
will exercise judgments based on  the  craf t  skills that  they  have learned f rom 
many years  of experience. Thus, the  objective of t he  analysis could be to  
achieve a redeployment pa t t e rn  maintaining the  level of achevernent  of t he  
basic objective, possibly achieving economies, or  raising the  s tandard of service 
as judged by the proxy objectives 
In the case of the study of the Oosterschelde estuary, the basic objective 
was to protect it irorn future flooding caused by violent storms, but the level of 
protection to be provided, as well as the myriad other objectives (ranging from 
the concerns about microscopic organisms to  those of humans) were all open for 
analysis. While the basic objective was widely agreed to,  the analysts could 
count on no such consensus for the others, and, in  fact, had to keep them all 
flexibly in view, in order to  allow the many parties of concern to  make their own 
judgments about them. 
In the case of the IIASA study of the world's energy future for the next 
fifty years, since there was no world energy executive-or even a closely knit set 
of officials who could be thought of as an approximation-the analysts had to 
attribute objectives to the world that would seem reasonable to the many execu- 
tlves and analysts who might later want to use the  study's findings as a contribu- 
tion to their own thinking about their narrower problems. In broad terms the  
basic objective assumed by the analysts was that  the world would want to sustain 
its use of energy indefinitely a t  a level that would maintain the standard of living 
in developed parts of the world and allow the developing parts  to increase their 
standard, whle accepting the population growth that  is expected. Supporting 
this basic objective there were many other objectives-for example, making the 
world's energy future grow by a natural and fairly smo0t.h evolution from the 
present world energy posture. While most of these supporting objectives were 
expected to be widely subscribed to, variant views were expected on many-an 
expectation that proved to be realistic. For example, some solar energy 
enthusiasts feel that  the assumption of a sustained standard of living is inap- 
propriate, that a smooth transition should be replaced by a sudden switch to 
solar energy, and that future world energy use should be assumed to undergo a 
significant per capita reduction. 
In sum, it is important to consider and evolve a clear concept of the objec- 
tives, and to seek as much of a consensus on them as possible. However, our 
examples suggest that  the consensus may not be achievable, particularly at  the 
beginning of the analysis, when the consequences of various objectives may not 
be perceived realistically by all concerned. On the other hand, when there are 
myriad objectives, many conflicting-as in the Oosterschelde analysis-the work 
can illuminate them and their consequences so as to allow accommodation 
among potentially conflicting parties in the process of deciding on a course of 
action. All of these matters  emphasize the importance of having a clear view of 
objectives, all of them that are relevant, even if they cannot be rationalized into 
a congenial set .  
In brief, finding the right objective is crucial, more important than it is to 
find the very best alternative. The wrong objective means the research is 
devoted to the wrong problem; to designate a slightly inferior alternative is not 
nearly so serious. 
Measuring effectiveness. To be considered an alternative, a course of 
action must be consis tent with the decisionmaker's objectives, i .e ., offer some 
hope of attaining the objectives, or a t  least of bringing them closer. For the pur- 
pose of quantitative analysis we would like a scale on which the effectivenesses 
of the various alternatives in attaining the objectives can be measured. The 
alternatives can then be compared and ranked in terms of effectiveness, that is, 
by their standings on the effectiveness scale. 
Unfortunately, a satisfactory scale cannot always be found easily. The prob- 
lem is that many objectives are difficult o r  impossible t o  quantify directly in any 
useful fashon.  It is therefore necessary to use a surrogate or proxy, a substi- 
tute objective that can be measured and that approximates the extent to  whch 
the real objective is attained. The problem is to get  a good approximation. 
Thus, to measure the quality of medical care in a community, the infant mortal- 
ity rate is often used as a proxy, even though it merely measures one aspect of 
the quality of medical care;  to measure fire-department performance, response 
time is often used (Walker e t  al. 1979, p. 81). 
One technique for  flnding quantifiable ways to  measure  effectiveness is to  
t ry  several successive modifications of tentative possibilities for stating the  
objective to  s ee  whether any substitutes or proxies a r e  suggested.  Sometimes it 
can  be easier  to examine several possible proxies to s ee  whether ,  if they were 
at ta ined,  t h e  desired end  would also be achieved. 
The m a r k  of a good proxy is tha t  its achevemen t  closely reflects achieving 
the real objective. Unfortunately, there a r e  a number  of madequate  but  com- 
mon approaches in use. 
One is t o  use input t o  measure output;  to  compare the  quality of primary 
school education in various districts in t e rms  of expenditures  per  pupil. A 
second is t o  use workload measures  or efficiency measures  t o  compare quality 
of output ,  say,  t o  compare  the  quality of pr imary educat ion on the basis of 
teacher-pupil  ratios. 
Consider a single unambiguous objective, say, to  improve garbage collec- 
tion. To facilitate comparisons, it is useful to  have a scale on which t o  measure 
the effectiveness of the  various possibilities. But t he re  is no obvious scale t o  
measure b e t t e r  garbage collect,ion, so we need a proxy-a subst i tute  objective 
measured by,  sap,  the percentage of cit.y blocks remaining without health 
hazards,  o r  the reduct ion In the number of fires involving uncollected solid 
waste, or  rodent  bites,  or valid citlzen complaints. All of these ,  unfortunately, 
t rea t  just a n  aspect ,  no t  t h e  full value, of be t te r  garbage collection. In pract ice,  
people often use  even less satisfactory scales,  for instance,  a n  input 
measure-expenditure per  household-or an  efficiency measure-number of tons 
collected p e r  man-hour-or a workload measure-tons of waste collected-that 
indicate nothing about  the  quality of the  work. 
When several a t t r ibu tes  need to be considered, a combination is sometimes 
used in which the various at t r ibutes  a r e  assigned weights, resulti-ng in a n  ordinal 
or  cardinal utility function. The failing here is t h a t  t he  function is to  a large 
extent  t h e  product  of t he  analyst's judgment as  t o  the  relative importance of 
the a t t r ibu tes  and  not  t ha t  of t h e  responsible decisionrnakers. The 
decisionmakers, if they were willing to spend the time, could work out their own 
se t  of weights (with guidance from the analyst) but even here the analyst's influ- 
ence is powerful. Hatry ( 1970) comments: 
There is no doubt tha t  the job of decisionmakers would be easier if 
a single effectiveness measure could approximately be used. However, 
I contend that  such procedures place the analyst in the position of 
making a considerable number of value judgments that  rightfully 
should be made in the political decision-makirg process, and not by 
the analyst. Such value judgments are buried in the pr.ocedures used 
by the analysts and are seldom revealed to, or understood by, the deci- 
sion makers. 
Such hocus pocus in the long run  tends to discredit analysis and 
distract significantly from what should be its principal role: to present 
to  decision makers alternative ways of acheving objectives, and to esti- 
mate and display all the major tradeoffs of cost and effectiveness tha t  
exist among these alternatives. [Emphasis in the original.] 
The Oosterschelde analysis described in Chapter 3 shows, not only that  i t  is 
not necessary to push disparate measures of effectiveness into a common meas- 
ure ,  but also displaying them with their relevant objectives can have important 
values for the  decisionmakers. 
In selecting a scheme to measure effectiveness, we are not only looking for 
a scale tha t  is positively correlated with the objective under consideration but 
also for one for which the  required data can be obtained. 
Suppose, for example, a n  ongoing government program for training com- 
puter  operators is to be  evaluated. If the object~.ve of the program is the even- 
tual increase in the gross domestic product (GDP), how can effectiven.ess be 
measured? One possibility is to  calculate the incr-ease in GDP caused by the  
increase in the income of the trainee that results from the training he receives; 
this requires tha t  the in.come of the trainee be total compensation (i .e. ,  include 
fringe benefits) and that  adjustment be made for displacing previous workers, if 
any, by the trainees. 
But how do we actually get the needed information? By following the his- 
tory of the  trainees after they leave the program, it is possible to estimate their 
actual income, but  how much of any change can be attributed to the training? 
One way to get  the desired information would be to carry out a social experi- 
ment (Chapter 7) in which participants are assigned randomly either to the pro- 
gram or to a control group, and then follow the wage experience of both groups. 
But the experiment could well be much more costly than the training program 
alone. A practical substitute would be to use the wage experience of a group of 
people having similar backgrounds to the trainees for comparison purposes. It 
is imperfect, but  conceptually correct; a measure based on it is likely to be 
superior to an  output measure such as the percentage of trainees to get jobs as 
computer operators. 
Multiple objectives,A decisionmaker may have more than one objective. If 
so, they may conflict; he may wish to reduce expenses but increase staff or to 
increase highway safety on a motorway between two cities but to decrease the 
travel time. In any event, if there are two or more objectives, they compete 
(except possibly for pairs where one is the means to the other) in the sense that ,  
for given resources, if the decisionmaker strives for maximunl attainment of a 
particular one, he must accept less than maximum attainment of the others.  
As is obvious, one cannot maximize benefits and mimmize cost simultane- 
ously or do somethng similar for any other pair of goals. But if the measures of 
attainment for these goals have a common unit, one can create a new goal to 
achieve the most advantageous combination. For instance, one can maximize 
benefits minus costs (as in cost-benefit analysis) provided both can be 
expressed in monetary units (Nagel and Keef i979). 
If there are several decisionrnakers, each with his own set  of objectives, a 
number of different approaches can be used to expedite the process of reducing 
the number of objectives to something that  can be used as a basis for analysis 
(Eilon 3.972, Keeney and Raiffa 1976). The following list gives some 
examples-each of these approaches requires discussion among the decision- 
makers holding competing objectives and a certain amount of compromise and 
concession: 
Objectives tha t  are only means to achieve other objectives can be elim- 
inated. 
If all the objectives can be interpreted as means to achieve some higher- 
level objective, and a relevant way to measure its effectiveness or that  of a good 
proxy corresponding to this objective can be found, then this higher-level objec- 
tive may serve as  the single objective. 
A preference ordering of objectives can sometimes be se t  up and used to 
effect tradeoffs among them. A solution is first determined using the highest- 
ranking objective; then an  effort is made to acheve  as  much of the second as 
possible without sacrificing too much of the first; and so on. 
All objectives except (the most important) one can be converted into con- 
straints, by agreement on a minimum level of attainment acceptable on each. 
Tradeoffs among the  objectives can be worked out and used to construct 
a composite index of worth, a value or utility function (decision analysis; see 
Raiffa 1968). 
No effort can be made to "optimize" with respect to any specific objec- 
tive. Instead, all objectives can be converted into constraints and a s o l u t i o ~  
determined under the agreement tha t  any solution satisfying all 
constraints-called a satisficing solution-will be "good enough." 
It is, of course, not always possible to  reach the agreement necessary to 
implement any of these sim.plifications, although the use of special techniques to 
increase the value sensitivity of decisionmakers (Dror 1975, p. 250) may make 
them more amenable to compromise. We will t reat  value sensitivity in a section 
under that title in Chapter 8 after discussing satisficing and the more common 
schemes for presenting results: cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis, 
decision analysis, and the so-called "scorecards." 
What we cannot do satisfactorily is construct a unique group objective from 
all the individual objectives that  automatically weights all the separate ones. 
Arrow ( 1  951) has proved, Tor example. tha t ,  under a f e w  reasonable assumptions, 
there is no general procedure for obtaining a group ranking from the rankings of 
the individual group members .  
Some idea of the interplay among objectives and their  measures can be 
gained from looking more closely a t  the blood availability and utilization exam- 
ple. The basic objective is, as  we said earlier,  t o  have blood available when and 
where needed. However, t o  this baldly idealistic objective-which could well 
entail very h g h  costs-was added a qualification: tha t  elective uses of blood be 
allowed to be postponed when supplies a re  short .  Within the  framework of 2. sys- 
t e m  meeting this goal, the  analysts considered two additional objectives: to  
reduce the amount of blood being outdated (and hence discarded) and to reduce 
the costs of maintaining the  blood supply a t  the points of use ( the proxy meas- 
ure for t h s  objective being the  average number of weekly deliveries t o  a hospital 
blood bank). 
The basic objective could be achieved by maintai.ning very large supplies a t  
the hospital blood banks a t  all t imes, but this policy would entail very large out- 
dating ra tes ;  in fact ,  most areas in the United States  were pursuing policies 
dominated by t h s  sort  of approach and were experiencing outdating ra tes  of 
0.20-that is, a fifth of the blood donated was not put to  its ultimate good use. 
On the other  hand, very low outdating ra tes  could be achieved merely by keep- 
ing minimal stocks a t  t he  hospital blood banks-but this would run  the risk of 
prejudicing seriously t h e  basic objective of availability where needed whenever 
needed. Another policy could possibly mee t  the demands of the  basic objective 
and the desire to reduce outdating to a. minimum: keep all blood centrally and 
deliver expeditiously when needed. Very little speculation is needed to  deter-  
mine the unacceptability of this policy; in addition to  escalating delivery costs,  
there would be unacceptable time delays in the  face of short- term health emer-  
gencies. 
The study then was aimed a t  a compromise among all of these objectives, 
and acheved it by keeping the basic objective a t  its former high and acceptable 
level while reducing the outdating and shortage rates (these lat ter  causing extra 
deliveries to be made from the center  to the hospital blood banks). The results 
of the first test  were: outdating reduced from 20 percent to 4 percent,  average 
weekly deliveries per hospital blood bank reduced from 7.8 to 4.2 (these figures 
also being an  indication of the increased adequacy of the hospital blood bank's 
supply, especially since 1.4  of the G.2 weekly deliveries were to cover shortages, 
the other 2.8 being routine prescheduled deliveries). Some experimentation 
with their models convinced the analysts that the 4 percent outdate rate was 
about the smallest tha t  could be achieved in t h s  balance among the three 
objectives; in  other words, this outdate ra te  represented a cost of pursuing a 
balance, ra ther  than just t h s  one objective. 
Similar discussions could be generated for the other examples in Chapter 3, 
but they would of necessity be much longer-too long for the space available 
here. Nor w ~ u l d  they contribute essentially new insights. However, the diligent 
reader would find the sources from which we have drawn our brief accounts a 
rich mine of instructive issues of the sort indicated in the blood-bank discussion. 
The objectives suggest the alternatives, the constraints restrict them and 
reduce the number of possibilities that can be considered. Constraints are thus 
more likely to simplify than to complicate the work of the analyst. 
Constraints often have a function similar to objectives from an evaluation 
point of view. Herbert Simon (1964,, p. 20) writes: 
It 1s doubtful whether decisions are generally directed towards a goal. 
It is easier and clearer to  view decisions as being concerned with dis- 
covering courses of action that  satisfy a whole se t  of constraints. It is 
t h s  se t ,  and not any one of its members,  tha t  is most accurately 
viewed as  the goal of the action. If we select any of the constraints for  
special attention, it is (a)  because of its relatlon to the motivations of 
the decisionmaker, or (b)  because of its relatlon to the search process 
that is generating or designing particular courses of action. Those con- 
straints that motivate the decisionmaker and those that guide his 
search for  actions are  sometimes regarded as more "goal-llke" than 
those that  limit the actions he may consider, or those that  are used to 
tes t  whether a potential course of action he has designed is satisfac- 
tory. Whether we t rea t  all the  constraints symmetrically or refer to  
some asymmetrically, as  goals, is largely a mat ter  of linguistic or ana- 
lytic convenience. 
When a distinction between objectives and constraints is made, it is usually 
based on the idea of a constraint as an absolute restriction, in contrast to an 
objective or goal that may be open ended. Majone (1978) suggests, and we con- 
cur ,  that  when there are several objectives they can always be traded off at  the 
margin if this leads to an improvement in the total utility. That is, it 1s reason- 
able to sacrifice a particular objective i f  the situation on the whole is thereby 
improved. A constraint on the other hand, cannot be so exchanged against 
other constraints, for its logical force resides wholly in its inviolability. Thus, 
the translations of a decislonmaker's desires into a problem formulation, includ- 
ing the definitions of limit values (constraints), must be done with a lot of care.  
For once a constraint, a limit value, is established by, or in concurrence with, 
the decisionmaker, it ~ 1 1 1  be held to during analysis (although, of course, it may 
be changed in a later analysis). Majone (1978) remarks:  
The opportunity cost of a proposed policy constraint must be carefully 
considered before the constraint becomes firmly embedded in the ana- 
lytic structure. As Hitch and h<cKean ( i960,  p .  196) write, 'casually 
selected or arbitrary con.straints can eas~ly  increase system cost or 
degrade system performance manifold, and lead to solutions that  
would be unacceptable to the person who se t  the constraints in the 
first place.' They cite the example of a weapon-systems study, where a 
constraint on acceptable casualities led to solutions in whch  100 mil- 
lion dollars was being spent, a t  the margin, to save a single life. Many 
more lives could have been saved with the same resources. Had the 
policymakers realized the opportunity cost of their safety require- 
ments, they would probably have set  them at  a lower level. Or, like 
good utilitarians, they may have chosen to treat  the risk factor as a 
subgoal, to be optimized compatibly with other system's requirements 
and the available resources. 
The constraints may be so restrictive that  no alternative will attain the  
objective. Demonstrating that  somethng cannot be done or can only be done if 
certain constraints are  removed may be just as important as  showing that  some- 
thing can be done, for it can save a great  deal of wasted effort and be on a 
sounder basis. 
Here again the blood availability example illustrates the points. We have so 
far treated the desirability of always having blood available when and where 
needed as  an objective, because the existing system allowed modest shortfalls 
affecting elective procedures. However, if i t  had been considered and treated as  
an inviolable constraint-one tha t  could easily be advocated by someone not 
familiar with the usual working of the health system-the analysis and its results 
would have been violently transformed, as also would its results. 
On the other hand, a constraint may be intrinsically inviolable. For exam- 
ple, the IIASA energy study could not yield a use of fossil fuels over the next fifty 
years greater  than the  available supply. However, careful scrutiny of the techni- 
cal possibilities yielded new views of this constraint, as  new forms of fossil 
resources could be exploited as  fuels when technology and economics become 
favorable (example: oil from oil sh.ales) o r  the available supplies could be 
extended by combining them with more advanced technologies (example: using 
breeder reactors to fuel coal gasification). 
The lesson is simple: objectives and constraints must not be treated as 
sacredly inviolable, but must  be scrutinized from many points of view as the 
analysis proceeds and technical possibilities emerge-and thew roles should bc 
subject to change. 
3. ALTERNATIVES 
The search for alternatives is the activity tha t  gives form and structure to 
systems analysis. No amount of modeling and evaluation will help to move the 
effort toward a solution unless the analyst can discover, design, or invent one or 
more satisfactory alternatives, that  is to say, actions or policies that offer hope 
of accomplishing what the decisionmaker wants. No amount of evaluation will 
uncover the best alternative available unless it appears among those investi- 
gated. 
An obvious illustration is suggested by Sugden and Williams (1978, p. 231): 
Consider, for example, a cost-benefit analysis tha t  compares the 
effects of undertaking a large programme of road-building in a city 
with the effects of taking no action and whch  finds that  the former pol- 
icy ls to be preferred. This might then be used as a n  argument that  
the whole programme ought to  be undertaken even though all that has 
been shown is tha t  this is better than doing nothng a t  all. It might well 
be that undertaking only a part  of the programme is preferable to 
either of the alternatives tha t  has been studied. 
To generate alternat-ives a t  the s tar t  of a study is clearly a creative ac t .  
Once we have one, it is easy to design an infinity of related alternatives tha t  are 
more costly or less efficient or possibly even marginally better,  but significant 
improvement is harder to  achieve. One must make a deliberate effort t.o think 
of possibilities; here brainstorming and talking to a variety of people helps. 
To design alternatives frequently means becoming well acquainted with the 
relevant technologies and working closely with the technologists with detailed 
knowledge of the techrlical possibilities. For example, the flood-control 
engineers developed the options for protecting the Oosterschelde estuary that 
were considered by the Rand team of systems analysts. In the IIASA study of 
world energy supply and demand a great deal of effort was expended on detailed 
inquiries into the possible technical options tha t  might be available for use with 
many forms of energy sources: coal, oil, solar, ocean thermal,  water power, and 
so on. The characteristic properties of these technical options could then enter 
the systems analysis calculations in the forms of contributions to the total 
energy supply, costs, material requirements, demands on the available stock of 
capital, and so on. 
T h s  is not to say that  the systems analyst should just consult a few technol- 
ogists and then adopt some alternatives. Experience shows that  an  interplay 
between the original alternatives and the issues in the  analysis may suggest 
important options with much improved properties in the light of the comprom- 
ises and tradeoffs tha t  the analysis reveals. For example, although the IIAS.4 
study of world energy supply and demand started with the presumption that  it 
would be possible for the world to move in 50 years from a major dependence on 
exhaustible sources of energy to principal reliance on renewable sources, the 
analysis showed that  t h s  would be so difficult as to be virtually impossible in so 
short a period. In f a c t ,  the study projected a significant increase in the use of 
energy from exhaustible sources (as Table 3.6 shows), although the proportion of 
the total supply from such sources could be expected to decrease somewhat (as 
Figure 3.10 shows). To make matters  worse, the analysts were forced to project 
a continuing high use of gas and easily transportable liquid fuels. With use of oil 
and gas from fossil sources having to decline for both supply and cost-of- 
production reasons, these find.ings turned attention, as  Figure 3.10 shows, to 
coal liquefaction and gasification, since the world has huge coal reserves. 
The lIASA analysis team observed (Energy Systems Program Group 1981): 
When coal-based synthetic fuels begin to take on such a large role, 
the technical processes by which they are produced also become most 
significant. . . . 
In autothermal coal gasi-fication and liquefaction schemes, both 
the process heat  and the required hydrogen are  produced by burning 
coal, in addition t o  the amount  of coal needed for the chemical carbon 
content  of the synfuels. A large amount of energy is lost in the  conver- 
sion process ,  and the  resulting gas o r  liquid contains about half of t he  
energy content of the original coal. 
For the allothermal process the process hea t  and the  required 
hydrogen a r e  supplied exogenously, preferably by means of heat  from 
a nuclear reactor  such  a s  the  high tempera ture  reactor  . . . or  in more  
futuristic schemes by means of hydrogen gas from a solar plant.  The 
synfuels thus produced have a higher energy content  than  t.he original 
coal. While in both processes the combustion of coal releases carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere,  the allothermal process requires less coal 
(by a factor of 3 to 4) and accordingly releases a smaller amount  of 
carbon dioxide than  the  autothermal  method.  . . . 
Thus, in t b s  case the  analysis showed tha t  the coal gasification and 
liquefaction process t h a t  made  important use of other  energy sources,  such  as  a 
high-temperature nuclear reac tor  or hydrogen gas from a solar plant,  offers 
~ m p o r t a n t  advantages: extending the useful life of the coal reserves,  allowing 
the shift from readily t ransportable  gas and liquid fuels to take place over a 
longer period, and reducing the amount of carbon dioxide released into the  
atmosphere.  The detailed calculations showed thls hybrid option. t o  have impor- 
tan t  advantages when development and investment allow lt to  be introduced.  
There a r e  many forces tha t  tend to  restr ic t  t he  r a rge  of alternatives likely 
to  be examined. Some of the strongest a r e  biases of various sorts due t o  the  
unconscious adherence t o  a n  organization's "party line" or cherished beliefs or  
even mere  loyalty (Kahn and Kann 195'7). When a problem is first discovered in 
a n  organization there is a tendency t o  look for a solution tha t  can  be controlled 
wi tbn  the organization. An administrator may initially bar  analysts from con- 
sidering cer tain kinds of alternatives for no be t te r  reason than  tha t  "we don' t  do 
things tha t  way." Staff analysts a r e  particularly vulnerable t o  biases of this  sor t .  
Another thing that  can happen is that  the analyst in talking with the 
decisionmaker or h s  staff becomes aware that the decisionmaker or h s  supe- 
rior doesn't like certain kinds of alternatlves. He may get the feeling that  it is 
not only useless but also hazardous to even give the impression that  he might be 
advocating these alternatives as  possible solutions. As a result, the development 
of these alternatives is likely to be neglected or forgotten. 
Various alternatives can also be advocated by enthusiasts, each of whom 
quite honestly believes that this alternative is the royal road to the problem's 
solution. One could easily imagine, in the blood-supply example, one enthusiast 
advocated all blood being delivered to the hospital blood banks on a 
prescheduled basis, with another advocating with equal enthusiasm that all 
deliveries be made on demand. With the analysis in hand, we now know that  the 
best compromise is a set schedule supplemented by a few demand deliveries 
when blood-bank supplies run short-in short, a hybrid option with an average of 
4.2 deliveries per hospital per week, two-thrds prescheduled and the other one- 
third on demand. Similarly, any citizen with even passing interest in the energy 
problem recalls that  various enthusiasts advocate singular solutions. One of the 
most vocal groups feels that  solar energy is an early prospect that  the world 
must adopt. On the other hand, perhaps the most important finding of the IIASA 
energy systems analysis is that-at least for the next 50 years-no one energy 
option can be relied on t o  solve the world's energy supply problem; rather,  a 
large spectrum of such options, as Figure 3.10 suggests, must be combined 
appropri.ately, with the totality managed with a view t.o having a completely sus- 
tainable system within the next century. In sum, the enthusiastically sponsored 
unitary solar option cannot do the  job within the next 50 years, according to the 
JlASA study. 
Alternatives need not represent the same approach to  obtaining the objec- 
tive. Suppose, for instance, the objective were to reduce crime. There are at 
least two categories of alternatives that might help to  attain this goal-social 
measures such as preventive education and antipoverty legislation or- police 
measures  such as severer  pumshment  and more cer taln apprehension of law n o -  
lators I n  the ~nvestigatlon, p o l ~ c e  measures  as  whole might be one a l te rna t~ve ,  
or  a spec~f l c  po l~ce  measure  such as  a 50 percent increase In the  number of pol- 
Ice cars  rnlght be another ,  o r  a combination of several police measures  with 
soclal measures  mlght be a fur ther  alternative 
The point is t ha t  a lot of thought has to be given t o  t he  design of alterna- 
tives. They will be eliminated or  modified to  remove or  add cer tain features as  
constraints a r e  discovered and applied, or as  their effectiveness is es t imated.  
Prelinunary evaluation in addition can be used to eliminate t he  grossly inferior 
and those t h a t  a r e  dominated by other  alternatives.  During the evaluation pro- 
cess t he  good features  of the be t te r  alternatives may suggest ways for t he  
analyst to design new and still be t te r  alternatives. 
Once we have a model o r  s e t  of models tha t  enables t he  analyst to  deter-  
mine the significant consequences of a class of alternatives,  the  analyst can  
investigate how the  spec t rum of consequences changes with changes In the  
alternatives (belng careful of course not to  make  the changes so radical that  t h e  
cred~bil l ty  of the model is brought into question) and thus improve some of t he  
alternatives The analyst mus t ,  however, not t ry  t o  car ry  t h s  process too fa r ,  
for, although the model resul ts  may show differences, they may really be inslgm- 
ficant considering how crude  our  models a r e  likely to be. There a re ,  of course,  
cer tain relatively narrow problems tha t  permlt  a closed mathematical  formula- 
tion or  model where a n  algorithm of one sort  o r  another ,  linear prctzrammlng f o r  
instance, permits  the  analyst to  investigate all alternatives of a certain class 
and d e s ~ g n a t e  one a s  best There a r e  few, lf any,  sociotechnical problems where 
such a formulation is possible, however 
As noted in Chapter 4, t he re  a r e  usually a number of characteristics or  
unstated objectires tha t  a decisionmaker expects o r  would like the  alternatives 
he selects t o  attain in reasonably high degree: insensitivity, reliability, inv.ulner- 
ab i l~ ty ,  znd flexibility a r e  some of these desired char.acter*istlcs. 
The deliberate generation of a wide range of alternatives is an essential step 
in systems analysis. One cannot investigate all of them thoroughly; it would be 
too costly and excessively time-consuming. Moreover, one could not then 
expect the client to look over the results. Some form of screening that reduces 
the number of alternatives to something like ten or less should be applied. Dom- 
inance or almost dominance may get rid of a few. Eliminating those with some 
important negative impact such as cost excessively large is another possibility. 
Elimination based on the analyst's judgment of a group of impacts is a further 
possibility; one can set up a set  of standards based on five or six characteristics 
and those that  fail to meet  these standards can be judged not good enough 
(Eilon 1972). 
The final few alternatives that survive t h s  screening may then have to be 
examined in even more detail. In fact, even after the selection is made, there 
may be aspects of the chosen alternative that  need to be worked out in greater 
detail before the final program for implementation is prepared. 
Strong alternatives make for easy analysis. A n  outstandingly good alterna- 
tive may make further analysis unnecessary; it may simply look so superior that  
acceptance is immediate. 
In sum, i t  is important to begin the analysis with good alternatives, and the 
time and effort needed to develop them. must be adequate to the task, and all of 
the relevant sources of technical expertise must be tapped in the process. On 
the one hand, the analysts should beware of the glib technologist who alleges 
that there are only two or three possibilities; on the other, he should be equally 
suspicious of alternatives developed entirely within the systems analysis team, 
for it will usually not contain representatives of all of the useful technologies. 
Rather, i t  is a synthesis that is called for, led by the systems analysis team with 
its eye clearly on the problem in hand. 
However, most important of all is the continuing awareness of the need for 
newer and better alternatives throughout the analysis that frequently holds the 
key to outstandingly useful results. The IJASA energy analysis team concluded 
that "The demand for liquid fuels is a principal driving force of the energy prob- 
;L 
lem." Their hybrid coal gasification and liquification scheme is an imporint step 
toward solving this driving problem. 
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